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When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most
divisive conflicts in the United States, The Irony of Vietnam raised eyebrows. Most critics argued that the country had stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation, as the New York Times put it. But Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, who had reviewed recently declassified White House and Defense Department documents, maintained that policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had their eyes open, had based decisions on a thorough knowledge of what was possible on the ground, and knew the cost of action and inaction. Explains Fareed Zakaria in his foreword, those prosecuting the war chose middle-of-the-road solutions, for a variety of what seemed reasonable assumptions. The overall tenor of the era that shaped foreign policy--the belief in the domino theory and a strident anti-communism--restricted policymakers' thinking and prevented a more flexible approach, however. And thereby lies a lesson for today's policymakers